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ASEAN–EU Relations: From 
Regional Integration Assistance to 
Security Significance?
Anja Jetschke and Clara Portela
The Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held 
their annual summit from 17 to 18 November 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
Analysis
European Union (EU) decision-makers have paid relatively little attention to the ASEAN 
region despite entering into a series of important agreements with ASEAN as a whole 
and with individual ASEAN member states: In July 2012 the EU entered into the Trea-
ty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), an important regulatory frame-
work for the region. In October 2012, it finished negotiating a partnership and coopera-
tion agreement (PCA) with Vietnam, and in December of the same year, it signed a free 
trade agreement (FTA) with Singapore. But despite these milestones, the EU generally 
has played a minor role in the region. To participate in Southeast Asia’s economic dyna-
mism, the EU must make clear its importance to the region – above and beyond trade.
  The ASEAN Charter of 2007 brought ASEAN’s institutional structures more in line 
with the EU. One important reform included making human rights protection one 
of ASEAN’s goals. 
  Myanmar’s political opening also provides the EU with new room to promote far-
reaching regional initiatives that could beef up ASEAN–EU relations.
  The EU’s role as a security actor in Southeast Asia remains marginal, as shown by 
ASEAN’s rejection of its bid to join the East Asia Summit (EAS). Whether the EU’s 
accession efforts will one day succeed depends on how regional actors rate its con-
tribution to major security issues.
Keywords:  EU, ASEAN, human rights, regional integration assistance, non-traditional se-
curity
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Introduction
The ASEAN foreign ministers’ annual summit on 
17 and 18 November 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cam-
bodia, was overshadowed by the South China Sea 
territorial dispute between China and individu-
al ASEAN members. At the summit, the problems 
resulting from China’s economic and political rise 
– for ASEAN as a regional organization as well as 
for its individual members – were delineated. Will 
ASEAN continue to be able to protect its members 
from external interference or will China’s growing 
influence weaken the entire organization?
Preoccupied with such problems as the eu-
ro crisis and the “Arab Spring” in the southern 
Mediterranean, EU decision-makers have thus 
far accorded little attention to Southeast Asia. Yet, 
should the EU wish to participate in Southeast 
Asia’s economic dynamism, it will have to rein-
force its political presence there. EU participation 
will increasingly depend on regional attitudes to-
ward China’s ascendance, which is perceived as 
a threat by most East Asian countries (aside from 
North Korea) and by most Southeast Asian coun-
tries (except for Cambodia, Laos, and possibly 
Thailand). The region needs new multilateral ini-
tiatives directed by ASEAN members. It is high 
time for the EU to double down on its efforts. A re-
vitalized ASEAN–EU relationship could strength-
en ASEAN, would allow for new approaches to 
conflict resolution, especially in the South China 
Sea, and benefit EU economic and political inter-
ests.
ASEAN–EU Relations and Their Role in 
Promoting Regional Integration
Since 2003, the EU has used assistance for 
ASEAN’s regional integration as a way to signal 
its economic and political presence there. Region-
al integration assistance is one of the principles 
guiding EU relations with other regional groups. 
Europe’s economic – and partly political – inte-
gration is regarded as a success and as the reason 
for the continent’s peace and prosperity; as a re-
sult, the EU sees itself as being entitled to promote 
regional integration projects around the world – 
based, if possible, on its own model. The main el-
ements of EU policy are financial support and the 
transfer of technical know-how. However, these 
instruments are becoming less effective, partly be-
cause the euro crisis has made the EU model of in-
tegration seem less attractive, and partly because 
the EU’s centrality is being weakened by other ac-
tors’ efforts to promote regional integration.
ASEAN’s integration ambitions date from 
the beginning of this century, when China’s eco-
nomic competition caused the regional organiza-
tion to fear for its economic and political survival. 
ASEAN’s request for help with regional integra-
tion allowed the EU to compensate for its almost 
non-existent political role, while EU technical co-
operation expanded the opportunity for the EU to 
drop its economic anchor in the region. Two re-
gional-integration support programs (ASEAN Re-
gional Integration Support Programmes I & II) 
have been completed – at the cost of more than 130 
million EUR. Each ASEAN member state annual-
ly contributes just 1 million USD to the organiza-
tion’s budget, which means that between 2003 and 
2010 the EU’s average annual contribution was ten 
times that of each ASEAN member.
Possibly as a result of EU support, in the last 
decade ASEAN has completely overhauled its in-
stitutional design and centralized its organization. 
Today, ASEAN is more integrated at the institu-
tional level than ever before and more closely re-
sembles the EU. Its name has been changed to the 
“ASEAN Community (AC),” which now consists 
of three communities (like the European Commu-
nities that predated the European Union and re-
main components of the EU), with its work orga-
nized around three pillars. The most significant in-
novation concerns the position of ASEAN’s secre-
tary-general, who now sits at the negotiating table 
with member-state representatives and is autho-
rized to present the AC position. To some extent 
this figure has a “supranational” character that is 
typical of the EU. This move toward integration 
is especially important because the ASEAN Sec-
retariat has developed a feeling for its role as the 
“guardian of the treaties” and learned about re-
gional integration mechanisms (EU Commission 
2009: v). This development is qualified, howev-
er, by the continued emphasis on cooperation be-
tween ASEAN member-state governments.
The EU’s special role in this process was due 
less to its more active foreign policy than to re-
gional dynamics, especially China’s competition 
with ASEAN for direct foreign investment follow-
ing the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 (Raven-
hill 2008), which led the EU to increase its commit-
ment to the region, and made it both more attrac-
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tive and more influential. The EU began to serve 
as a kind of “model” for ASEAN and also as a do-
nor for ASEAN’s integration efforts – a new role 
that fit with the EU’s self-image as a worldwide 
sponsor of regional integration efforts to promote 
peace and to integrate developing countries into 
the world market (Jetschke 2013). Three develop-
ments challenge this policy:
1) Regional integration assistance is losing its spe-
cial benefit for ASEAN–EU relations since such 
support no longer comes only from the EU, but 
also from Australia, the Asian Development 
Bank and the US, all of which – like the EU – 
want to spread their own concepts of region-
al integration (see e.g. AusAid 2012). Increased 
competition in assistance limits the ability of 
EU programs to signal the EU’s illustrious co-
operation with ASEAN.
2) The goal of regional integration is called in-
to question by new developments that the EU 
cannot control. At the same time that fears 
about China’s future role are stimulating re-
gional integration within ASEAN, Chinese di-
rect investments and economic interests are ex-
erting a centrifugal force on ASEAN member 
states. Cambodia’s reluctance to mention Chi-
na’s militarization of the South China Sea in 
ASEAN’s joint communiqué – as demanded by 
the Philippines and Vietnam – hints at China’s 
increasing influence (Casarini 2012: 2), and some 
ASEAN members’ growing dependence on 
trade with China is blocking external integra-
tion efforts more than ever.
3) The emerging pattern of entering into free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and partnership and coop-
eration agreements (PCAs), while not problem-
atic in itself, could undermine the EU’s vision 
of promoting multilateral integration in the re-
gion. Following its failed attempt to create an 
ASEAN–EU FTA, the EU began to sign bilat-
eral free trade agreements, as well as partner-
ship and cooperation agreements. These bilat-
eral agreements in the region replicate the bilat-
eralism of other governments, especially that of 
Japan and the US, and substitute for the failed 
ASEAN–EU free trade agreement. While trade-
oriented FTAs are economic-only agreements 
that are meant to increase the EU’s access to the 
region, PCAs are intended as framework agree-
ments and contain both political and econom-
ic provisions. These two types of treaties are re-
lated because they are conceived of as a pack-
age and are meant to co-exist (Lim 2012). They 
are designed to ensure that the EU’s economic 
and foreign policy goals are being served. Vari-
ous combinations can be observed: The EU has 
signed PCAs with Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam, while an FTA is only in the pro-
cess of being negotiated with Vietnam. Paral-
lel negotiations for both treaties were initiated 
with Malaysia and Singapore, and an FTA was 
signed with Singapore on 16 December 2012. A 
PCA is currently being negotiated with Thai-
land, and both parties have held out the pros-
pect of soon beginning to negotiate an FTA. The 
pattern of FTA and PCA negotiations indicates 
the EU’s negotiating power – or lack thereof – 
and the regional impediments it faces. PCAs 
have been signed with partners that are of-
ten still pursuing protectionist policies, which 
stalls the finalizing of FTAs. While FTAs have 
been negotiated more rapidly with the econom-
ically stronger ASEAN members such as Ma-
laysia and Singapore, PCA negotiations with 
these countries have been slower. Consequent-
ly, the practice of signing first a PCA and then 
an FTA has been modified. Table 1 shows the 
status of the bilateral agreements (Matthiessen 
2012).
The EU’s differential FTA strategy in Asia shows 
how it prioritizes key trade partners, especially 
those that have already signed an FTA with the 
US (Garcia 2012). The EU is signaling its willing-
ness to participate in Asia’s economic dynamism – 
at a time when it sorely needs growth markets – 
as well as its intention to remain ASEAN’s third 
most important economic partner after China and 
Japan (EU Commission 2012). Yet the EU should 
not cast its role in Southeast Asia in economic 
terms alone. In the long run, the EU’s significance 
as a trade partner for ASEAN might be reduced 
if, as expected, China’s economic importance for 
ASEAN continues to grow. 
This context requires the EU to develop a strat-
egy for becoming a more important actor in Asia. 
The EU should continue to assist regional inte-
gration and encourage common positions among 
ASEAN member states. It must communicate how 
the EU’s bilateral approach can be combined with 
its long-term goal of supporting multilateralism 
in the region. EU partnership agreements could 
be more effectively used to harmonize positions 
within ASEAN, with the EU acting as an “external 
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federalist” for the organization. Two key countries 
deserve special attention: Indonesia is not only an 
emerging power but, as the region’s most demo-
cratic state and the world’s largest Muslim coun-
try, it also plays a key role in promoting a human 
rights agenda within ASEAN. Vietnam is gaining 
central importance because of its strategic loca-
tion in continental Southeast Asia, and could offer 
leadership and promote unity among ASEAN’s 
socialist states (Cambodia and Laos). In any case, 
the EU should clearly indicate that assistance for 
countries like Vietnam is intended to help unify 
the ASEAN Community rather than create a stra-
tegic counterweight to China.
ASEAN–EU Relations and Human Rights 
The EU Treaty stipulates that EU foreign policy 
goals include the protection of human rights. The 
European Parliament, which has had to approve 
all EU trade agreements since 2009, is a dogged de-
fender of human rights promotion as part of Euro-
pean foreign policy. Since the EU’s first attempts 
to upgrade its relations with ASEAN from pure-
ly economic to political, human rights abuses – 
first in Timor-Leste and then in Myanmar – have 
prevented ASEAN–EU relations from flourishing 
(Lim 2012). Myanmar’s 1997 admission into the 
AC sorely strained relations between the organi-
zations, with EU condemnations of Myanmar cre-
ating a crisis in interregional relations and causing 
meetings to be canceled. 
The ASEAN–EU relationship could be revived 
rapidly, however. On the initiative of Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, which are seeking 
to lock in their domestic reforms at a regional lev-
el, ASEAN has developed its own human rights 
agenda and is nurturing its image as a community 
based on the rule of law. 
Highlighting human rights in EU foreign poli-
cy commitments will not negatively affect the EU’s 
economic interests. By encouraging human rights 
reforms, the EU assists ASEAN member states in 
carrying out domestic reforms and helps ASEAN 
to develop its identity as a rule-based community. 
The EU can build on the human rights declaration 
that was agreed upon at ASEAN’s 2012 summit 
in Phnom Penh, which followed the establishment 
of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. Unfortunate-
ly, the declaration does not provide any mecha-
nisms for regional implementation. In fact, its hu-
man rights instruments actually affirm the princi-
ples of sovereignty and non-intervention, which 
led the much-vaunted new declaration to be criti-
cized by regional human rights organizations for 
the secrecy of its negotiating process. UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem 
Pillay called on ASEAN governments to suspend 
their adoption of the draft declaration because it 
was not in line with universal standards and the 
public had not been consulted (Ririhena and Sra-
ragih 2012). Furthermore, 62 human rights orga-
nizations – including Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch – criticized the draft decla-
Table 1: Status of ASEAN–EU Bilateral Agreements 
Source: Matthiessen 2012.
Partner Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Free Trade Agreement
Indonesia Signed (Oct. 2009) In preparation(scoping exercise underway)
Philippines Signed (July 2012) In preparation(scoping exercise in preparation)
Vietnam Signed (June 2012) Negotiations (June 2012–)
Singapore Negotiations (2011–) Signed (2010–16 Dec. 2012)
Malaysia Negotiations (Dec. 2010–) Negotiations (Sept. 2010–)
Thailand Negotiations (2010–) In preparation(scoping exercise underway)
Brunei Announced (April 2012) Planned
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ration on the grounds that it “creates a sub-stan-
dard level of human rights protection in the re-
gion” (Amnesty International 2012). However, the 
symbolic value of the explicit protection of human 
rights in a part of the world that, 15 years earlier, 
had questioned the universality of human rights 
should not be underestimated. Although the dec-
laration fails to provide for sanctions, it does con-
tain the potential for improvement, and will help 
orient not just civil society organizations in the re-
gion, but also governments that henceforth will be 
measured against its standards.
This regional policy is reinforced by develop-
ments in Myanmar. Since entering office in 2011, 
President Thein Sein’s gradual introduction of re-
forms (including legalizing opposition parties, re-
laxing censorship and releasing political prison-
ers) has been hailed by the EU: Sanctions have 
been lifted, development aid increased and prom-
inent EU politicians have made their first official 
visits (Bünte and Portela 2012). Myanmar’s open-
ing has provided the EU with the opportunity to 
assist its reform process, which is crucial for the 
ASEAN–EU relationship. With Myanmar no lon-
ger an issue for dispute, cooperation can be ex-
panded. 
ASEAN–EU Relations and Traditional and Non-
traditional Security 
China’s emergence in the region and its rise to the 
status of “world power” will continue to pose a 
challenge for the Southeast Asian states and to af-
fect ASEAN–EU relations. Territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea remain a source of tension 
that has been insufficiently addressed by region-
al organizations. The EU has limited its scope to 
help resolve the conflict, while the ASEAN Re-
gional Forum (ARF) explicitly bars any discus-
sion of the subject. Basically, ASEAN member 
states do not consider the EU to be a relevant ac-
tor regarding issues of regional security (Portela 
2010). As Arif Havis Oegroseno, the EU ambassa-
dor from Indonesia, put it, the EU “is not and will 
never be a military power in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion” (Oegroseno 2012: 15). ASEAN countries also 
fear losing their centrality in the security forum, 
should it be enlarged again. 
It is up to the EU to convince ASEAN of the 
relevance of its membership in the EAS, which 
should be facilitated as a result of signing the 
TAC on 12 July 2012. The ASEAN member states 
consider the legally binding TAC – which dates 
from 1976 – as a collectively binding code of con-
duct. The norms established in the TAC originat-
ed in the Non-Aligned Movement but also resem-
ble those in the Helsinki Final Act, signed by 38 
countries at the Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, which man-
aged to contain the East–West conflict. The TAC 
commits its partners to the principles of indepen-
dence, equality, territorial integrity, non-inter-
ference and the renunciation of force. Altogeth-
er, 18 non-ASEAN countries have signed the trea-
ty – among them Australia, Brazil, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey 
and the US. In order for the EU to enter the trea-
ty as a regional organization, it was necessary for 
ASEAN to adopt a special protocol. This is a sign 
of ASEAN’s special interest in the EU. Signing the 
TAC means that for the first time, the EU has “en-
gaged at a strategic level with ASEAN under a le-
gally binding framework with a dispute settle-
ment mechanism” (Oegroseno 2012).
In view of the mutually exclusive territorial 
claims, the TAC does not lend itself to conflict res-
olution. However, the TAC does enjoy great legit-
imacy in the region and its emphasis on the prin-
ciples of nonviolent conflict management could 
make it a stabilizing element. The confidence- and 
security-building measures (CBMs) that were de-
veloped at the CSCE provide the EU with instru-
ments that could be utilized to transform the TAC 
into an instrument for resolving conflicts. Unlike 
the informal ARF, which has also adopted CBMs 
but remains in stasis, the TAC framework pro-
vides a legally binding framework. The EU could 
attempt to broker a regional acknowledgment that 
the claims to the islands in the South China Sea 
are legitimate but mutually exclusive. So far, the 
countries involved have been unprepared to ac-
knowledge the other parties’ territorial claims. 
Once this recognition has been granted, the EU 
could then develop proposals for jointly exploit-
ing the resources that are believed to lie beneath 
the sea. 
Here, the EU could stress that its support 
for multilateralism and a negotiated settlement 
strengthens ASEAN’s position vis-à-vis China, 
which is becoming increasingly assertive. Such an 
approach would also respond to Indonesian fears 
of ASEAN becoming the site of a showdown be-
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tween China and the US that could destabilize the 
whole region (Conde 2012). 
Finally, the EU should further emphasize and 
better publicize its contribution to non-traditional 
security. The post-Cold War expansion of the con-
cept of security that became accepted once Asia 
had adopted the notion of “non-traditional” secu-
rity has allowed the EU to present itself as a secu-
rity actor (Maier-Knapp 2012). The EU has finan-
cially committed itself in many areas, such as food 
security, disaster prevention, counter-terrorism, 
environmental protection and climate change, 
and will continue its cooperation, especially in 
the area of civil protection, as indicated at the last 
ASEAN–EU ministerial meeting in Brunei in April 
2012. In the region, the EU is mostly perceived as 
a humanitarian actor or development aid donor; 
it has not made a name for itself as a security ac-
tor. Were the EU to promote its current activities 
as being relevant to security, it could increase its 
chances of being admitted to the East Asia Sum-
mit.
Since the mid-1990s, EU goals and strategies 
regarding ASEAN have remained pretty much 
unchanged. But the current changes in Asia re-
quire the EU’s close monitoring to keep pace with 
economic developments in the region. The EU has 
not been recognized as a security actor there, and 
instead has concentrated on non-traditional secu-
rity and support for regional integration. 
Even if regional integration assistance were to 
lose its significance for ASEAN–EU relations, the 
EU would still have a role to play in the region. 
There is a dearth of promising multilateral initia-
tives to solve regional conflicts, and ASEAN mem-
ber states’ internal developments, especially in the 
realm of human rights, offer the possibility of en-
hanced ASEAN–EU relations.
The EU is expected to pursue its dual approach 
of nurturing cooperation in non-traditional secu-
rity and regional integration. At the same time, the 
EU can also promote human rights, especially in 
countries that are undergoing a process of transi-
tion, without having this negatively impact eco-
nomic relations.
We recommend a new approach to the EU’s 
ASEAN policy that
 − expands regional integration around targeted 
bilateral relations – as with Indonesia and Viet-
nam (in doing so, the EU should explain that 
the bilateral relations are intended to strength-
en ASEAN as a multilateral forum);
 − broadens the EU’s approach of sharing expe-
riences above and beyond regional integra-
tion assistance and also incorporates the TAC, 
which could be developed into an effective in-
strument for resolving the conflict in the South 
China Sea – based on experience from the Hel-
sinki Final Act;
 − pursues its human rights initiatives as a means 
of supporting ASEAN member states’ domes-
tic reforms in human rights protection (a robust 
strategy for Myanmar could constitute an im-
portant cornerstone of Europe’s ASEAN poli-
cy); and
 − refers to EU “non-traditional security” support 
for ASEAN countries in the areas of disaster 
preparedness, counter-terrorism, health, envi-
ronment and climate change with a view to up-
grading the EU’s reputation in the region from 
that of a “development actor” to a “security ac-
tor.” 
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